Abstract. In communicative exchanges, sentences are uttered against a background of shared beliefs or attitudes which helps the audience to determine the content of what the speaker has said. Unfortunately, different agents may have different views of this common ground. From this standpoint, one of the most familiar phenomena is accommodation, which enables the addressee to incorporate the speaker's presuppositions into her own view of the common ground. As suggested by definition (URR), this phenomenon is analyzed here as a case of global context shift, since the missing piece of information, which the addressee is willing to share, will be an integral part of the revised context. A less familiar, but equally important, phenomenon is what I call discommodation, whose main feature consists in the fact that the missing piece of information, although essential to the comprehension of the utterance, cannot be shared by the addressee because it sounds problematic or even false to her. This is not a marginal aspect of communicative exchanges, which are often characterized not only by different views of the common ground, but also by incompatible views. In such cases the addressee opens a "presuppositional slot" to take into account the assumptions which serve to select the reference of the noun phrase, but which are not incorporated into the revised context because of the addressee's disagreement. Thus, such a process is analyzed as a case of local context shift, which affects only the noun phrase and which, unlike global context shifts, allows us to keep considerations about reference distinct from considerations about truth. Starting from the problem of the truth-value of sentences uttered in contexts containing false assumptions, one of the main purposes of the paper is to propose a definition of truth (with respect to a presuppositional apparatus) which does not ignore the role of discommodation when different views of the common ground are involved. The relevant truth conditions are given in (TC). Finally, this definition is used in the last two sections of the paper to justify the idea that, in the cases of misdecription made popular by Donnellan, one can recognize the semantic role of the speaker's reference without assuming the ambiguity of the definite descriptions 1 .
.

The problem.
A context, conceived of as a body of information which is supposed to be shared by the participants in a communicative exchange, plays two crucial roles in the semantics of natural languages. First of all, it serves to fix the content of an utterance U, since it represents the background against which U must be interpreted. Secondly, it determines the updated context which results from adding this content to it. An elegant formalization 2 of these concepts is based on the idea that a set X of shared propositions (the "common ground") is represented as a context set C, i. e. the set of possible worlds which are compatible with the propositions in X, and that the proposition p expressed by uttering a sentence S with respect to X is a subset of C, so that the update of C is obtained by eliminating from C the worlds that are not in p. Unfortunately, if contexts and contents (that is propositions) are characterized in these terms, one has to face the following problem. To say that a proposition, seen as a set p of possible worlds, is true is tantamount to saying that the actual world @ is in p. Now take a context X represented by a context set C and suppose that X contains a false assumption (even a negligible mistake, if you like). Thus, because of the presence of this false assumption, @ cannot belong to C. But consider any proposition p expressed in this context: since p is a subset of C, it cannot contain @. So, the conclusion is that no true proposition can be expressed in X: an unwelcome result indeed, for the presence of a wrong assumption in a context X (a phenomenon which is rather frequent in communicative exchanges) does not justify the idea that no true proposition can be expressed in that context. Since this problem is independent of the logical consistency of a context, to avoid unnecessary complications from now on I will assume that a context X is a consistent set of propositions.
definite description (i. e. Leo). So, the obvious solution, in this case, is to replace the "false" context with a new one, where the false proposition is simply eliminated 6 . Yet, in order to avoid an ad hoc solution to deviant cases like A, we must preserve a unitary formulation of the truth conditions. In other terms, the new truth conditions should be equivalent to (T) when dealing with "normal" cases, but, when dealing with "deviant" cases, they should guarantee the sort of context shift which is required by the elimination of the false proposition. To obtain this result I will assume that our truth conditions, where contexts are treated as set of possible worlds, are associated with a suitable ordering of the worlds. There are several ways to formalize such an ordering. Here, I will adopt a "system of spheres" which is a modification 7 of the one introduced by Lewis (1973) and which is defined as follows.
Let C be any subset of W (the set of possible situations). A collection S of subsets of W is a system of spheres centred on C if it satisfies the following conditions: (i) S is totally ordered by ⊆ (ii) W ∈ S (as a consequence, W is the largest element in S) (iii) C ∈ S and, for any X in S, C ⊆ X (i. e. C is the ⊆-minimum of S) (iv) For any proposition p: if there is any sphere X in S such that S ∩ p ≠ ∅, then there is a smallest sphere Y such that Y ∩ p ≠ ∅. (This is the limit assumption discussed by Lewis 8 .) In virtue of (i) -(iv), a system of spheres S centred on C in w can be associated with a function f C : ℘(W) →℘(W) which is defined as follows:
for any p ∈ ℘(W) f C (p) = W if X ∩ p = ∅ for every X in S f C (p) = Y ∩ p, where Y is the smallest sphere in S such that Y ∩ p ≠ ∅. It is also possible to associate S with a function REV @ : S → S which is defined as follows: REV @ (X) = Y, where Y is the smallest sphere in S such that X ⊆ Y and @ ∈Y.
Intuitive meaning. The smallest sphere C (on which the system is centred) can be seen as a context set (representing a certain background of assumptions). Given two worlds w and w', if there is a sphere X such that X contains w but not w', we can say that w is "closer" to C than w'. In other words, the distance of a world w with respect to C (i. e. the location of w in the system of spheres) is proportional to the degree of incompatibility of w with the set of assumptions represented by C. Thus, f C (p) is the set of p-worlds which are "maximally" close to C and it can be interpreted as the result of the minimal revision of C once p has been accepted as true. As for REV @ , it associates 6 This problem is discussed in Heim (1982: 339-340) , where the theoretical framework she adopts is the File Change Semantics: 'So if we are given an utterance of a logical form φ that occurs in a situation where a false file obtains, then we do not stubbornly insist on considering F itself, but we try to find some true file F* that is as similar as possible to F, except that (a) certain cards of F whose presence is not required for the felicity of φ may be missing from F*, and (b) certain entries or file cards of F (that are also irrelevant to the felicity of φ) may be missing from the corresponding cards of F*.' 7 See Grove (1988) for the modified version of Lewis's system which is adopted here. Do not forget that, as specified at the outset, we are considering only those contexts which are logically consistent, even though they may contain false propositions. Removing this assumption would entail a complication of the semantics which is not relevant here. See Arló-Costa (2002) for a treatment of propositions which would allow us to deal with the case of inconsistent contexts. 8 Lewis (1973) points out some problems for this assumption. Yet, his counterexamples are based on the fact that his system is centred on the real world @, so that whenever we assume that a given sphere Y is the smallest sphere such that Y ∩ p ≠ ∅, it is always possible to find worlds that are closer to @ than those in Y. As a consequence Y cannot be considered as the smallest sphere with those characteristics any longer. It should be noticed, however, that in the present framework a system of spheres is centred, in general, on a context set C which represents a set X of presupposed propositions. So it seems reasonable, in this case, to assume that worlds which are too finely individuated to be discernible with respect to the context X of presuppositions count as equally "close" to C. See, on this point, Bonomi and Zucchi (2003) .
with any sphere X in S the smallest sphere which includes it and which is compatible with the actual world. In particular, if @ ∈ C, then REV @ (C) = C and, if @ ∉ C, then REV @ (C) is the smallest sphere, in S, containing @. In the latter case we have a proper expansion of C, which means that the false assumptions have been removed from the original context to make it compatible with the reality.
It is now possible to replace (T) with the following truth conditions:
(TR) Given a context X, represented by the context set C, an utterance of the sentence S in X is true iff @ ∈ [[S]](REV @ (C)).
Here, the system of spheres S is centred on C and REV @ (C) is, in any case, the smallest sphere in S containing @. (The idea is that REV @ (C) gives us the minimal revision of C which is compatible with the real world and which, as a consequence, represents a context containing no false assumption.) As pointed out above, if @ ∈ C (which happens when X contains only true presuppositions), then REV @ (C) = C: in this case, as desired, (TR) is equivalent to (T). In conclusion, the truth conditions given in (TR) are unitary in the sense that they can account for the "normal" situations (where no false proposition is assumed as true) and for the "deviant" ones (characterized by the presence of false assumptions). In the former case there is a vacuous context shift, and the revised context coincides with the original one; in the latter case the revised context is really a new context which, in our example A, allows us to evaluate (1) as true, as intuitively required.
Misdescriptions.
We have just seen that (TR) solves the problem raised by situations like the one illustrated by case A, where the presence of a false assumption does not affect the interpretation of the constituents in (1). But consider this other situation.
Case B. This time, sentence (1), that is 'The man wearing a fez is a poet', is uttered in a context where everybody is convinced that there is only one man wearing a fez and that this man is Leo, and where the speaker uses the definite description 'the man wearing a fez' with the clear intention to refer to Leo 9 . Unfortunately, this is a case of misdecription, for the hat that Leo (a distinguished poet) wears is not a fez, but a different (although similar) kind of hat.
The main difference between cases A and B is that if in case B we want to determine the content of an utterance of (1) in the context at issue and evaluate it as true or false, we cannot eliminate the false assumption (as is possible in case A). Indeed, this assumption is necessary to pick out the intended reference of the definite description, which is an essential ingredient of the proposition expressed in that context. If we give up the (wrong) assumption that Leo is the man with the fez, there is no way to grasp the reference of the definite description 10 . Thus the strategy based on (TR) is not sufficient this time. What we want to do, in situations like the one described in case B, is to take into account the false assumption in order to fix the intended reference of the definite 9 The problem of the semantic role of the speaker's reference, which has been the object of a fair amount of discussion since the publication of Donnellan (1966) , will be addressed in the last two sections of the paper. 10 This is so if no person satisfies the definite description, or several persons satisfy it. But even if one single man (different from Leo) should satisfy it, this man would not be the intended reference of the definite description in the context at issue. It is this reference which is relevant to grasp the proposition expressed by (1) in that context, that is the proposition that the addressee is willing to accept as true if she judge the speaker to be a reliable source of information about Leo's literary activity. I'll take up this problem later on, when discussing the relationship between the common ground as such, i. e. as a set X of beliefs that are really shared by the participants in a communicative exchange, and the assumptions about X made by these participants. description and the proposition that the speaker wants to communicate. Even though the presence of this false assumption prevents us from using the actual world @ as the evaluation world, we intend to avoid any unnecessary divergence with respect to the characteristics of @, because we are still interested in the truth of the utterance. In the theoretical framework under discussion, this conservative attitude can be accounted for by selecting in the relevant context set C, as possible substitutes of @, only the worlds which are "maximally" close to @. Thus, what we get is the following definition, where the system of spheres S is centred on the real world @, more exactly on {@}, and SUPP is a function from sets of worlds to sets of worlds such that SUPP(p) = p if @ ∈ p and SUPP(p) = f {@} (p) if @ ∉ p:
(TRR) Given a context X, represented by the context set C, an utterance of the sentence S in X is true iff, for every C-world w which is "maximally" close to {@}, w ∈ [[S]](SUPP(C)); the utterance is false iff, for every C-world w which is "maximally" close to {@}, w ∉
[[S]](SUPP(C)).
Take case B, where @ ∉ C. By definition, SUPP(C) = f {@} (C) = Y ∩ C, where Y is the smallest sphere in S such that Y ∩ C ≠ ∅. This means that all the worlds in f {@} (C) are C-worlds: as a consequence, in our example, the identity 'Leo = the man wearing a fez' is true in all these worlds, and this fact gives us Leo as the intended reference of the definite description. And since in these worlds, which are the C-worlds maximally close to {@}, Leo is a poet, sentence (1) is evaluated as true in the case B, which is the expected result. Notice that if X does not contain any false assumption and, as a consequence, @ ∈ C, then SUPP(C) = C. In this case there is only one world which is maximally close to {@} (it is @ itself) and the truth conditions given in (TRR) are equivalent to those given in (TR), as desired. In other words, definition (TRR) is still unitary in the sense discussed above, for it covers both the "normal" cases and the "deviant" ones. We have just seen that (TRR) allows us to evaluate (1) as true in the given circumstances, which is exactly what we wanted. But if we ask ourselves whether (TRR) gives us, in general, plausible truth conditions, the answer is negative. The problem is that all the evaluation worlds (i. e. all the worlds in SUPP(C)) are C-worlds, and, as a consequence, all the propositions presupposed in the context represented by C are evaluated as true, including the false ones (if any). To use a metaphor, the difficulty is caused by the fact that in (TRR) truth and reference share the same destiny, in the sense that the context shift required to fix the intended reference of a part of the sentence (the NP, which in this case is a definite description) determines the truth-value of the whole sentence as well. A little more exactly: the worlds we resort to in order to fix the reference of the definite description are, at the same time, the worlds we resort to in order to evaluate the whole sentence. This point can be clarified by considering a different, but related, kind of example 11 :
(2a) Bergotte, a famous novelist, expired while visiting an exhibition of Swann's favourite painter. (2b) No famous novelist has ever expired while visiting an exhibition of Swann's favourite painter.
These two sentences are intuitively true, but for different reasons. (2a) is true in Proust's Recherche. So, this particular context is what determines not only the reference of the definite description (i. e. Vermeer), but also the truth-value of the whole sentence. As for (2b), it is not true in the Recherche, whilst it is factually true, even though the reference of the definite description (Vermeer, once again) is determined by the same context as before, that is the Recherche. To sum up, in the case of (2b), that I will discuss in detail later on, the context which is relevant for reference does not coincide with the context which is relevant for truth. In the case of (2a) these contexts coincide. This is why (2b) requires a "local" context shift (limited to the definite description), whilst (2a) requires a "global" context shift (involving the whole sentence). Thus, (TRR), which is based on a global context shift, can be appropriate, at most, to explain what it means, for an utterance of S in a context X, to be true in X (or, more exactly, to be true in a variant of X which is maximally close to the real world). For the same reasons, it can be appropriate to account for the truth of a sentence such as 'In fiction F, S', where the operator 'In fiction F' justifies a global context shift 12 .
But if the present analysis is correct, we must also conclude that it is exactly this type of context shift which makes (TRR) inadequate to deal with (2b) or to account for the occurrence of misdescriptions in situations like the one described in case B.
Interpreting the context shift.
So far, we have endorsed a very naïve notion of common ground or context, for we have tacitly characterized it as the set X of beliefs or attitudes which are really shared by the participants in a communicative exchange. The problem is that, whilst it is quite natural to think that X is not empty (for in any communicative exchange the agents are perfectly aware that someone is speaking, someone is listening, and so on) and that part of this information (as, for instance, the facts concerning the exchange itself that I have just mentioned) is easily accessible to those participants, it is also plausible to recognize that in general they have only a partial and hypothetical view of the common ground. This is so, of course, because nobody has a direct access to the beliefs of the other participants and, as a consequence, each of them can only make suppositions about the common ground, without knowing what exactly it is in many circumstances 13 . Moreover, each participant in the communicative exchange makes suppositions not only about the present state of the common ground, but also about how it should be if the relevant information which is available to her was added to it. In what follows, when I speak of an agent's view of the common ground, I will refer, in general, to this more comprehensive characterization of the view at issue. These remarks can have interesting consequences in interpreting the type of context shift on which the truth conditions in (TRR) are based. As we have seen, the intuitive idea is that, in a case of misdescription such as the one discussed above, the false piece of information must be preserved (in order to pick out the intended reference of the singular term) and must be incorporated into a new context which is maximally compatible with the real world, or, more exactly, with the context {@}. From a cognitive point of view, if α is the author of the utterance and β is the addressee, such a picture corresponds to a very idealized situation of this type: (i) β has a complete knowledge of the facts 14 ; (ii) part of this information is in contrast with the false assumptions which characterize α's view of the common ground, and β is aware of this fact; (iii) to evaluate the utterance, β endorses this view, while leaving all the rest unchanged. Within the limitations discussed at the end of the last section, such an idealization can be useful as an approximation to the notion of truth with respect to a context (once this context has been revised by a neutral observer), but it does not mirror the empirical circumstances in which concrete agents must operate. In the light of the above considerations about the partial and hypothetical views of the common ground associated with different agents, a more reasonable approach is the following: (a) 12 The semantics of this kind of operator is discussed in Bonomi and Zucchi (2003) , where the revised context required to evaluate sentences of the form 'In fiction F, S' is actually much more complicate than the one mentioned in (TRR). 13 In Beaver (2001: 236-249 ) an agent's uncertain knowledge of the common ground is formally treated as an "information set" (i. e. a set of information states: the idea is that 'each state in the set corresponds to a possibly correct model of [the agent's] assumptions about the common ground'). 14 Notice that in (TRR) the system of spheres is centred on {@} in order, for example, to evaluate (1) as true when uttered in the "false" context C, as illustrated in case B. Intuitively speaking, the context set {@} represents a context where one knows everything there is to know. the system of spheres must be centred not on {@}, but on the context set D, which represents β's view of the common ground; (b) C represents not the context of α's presuppositions as such (i. e. α's view of the common ground), but β's conjectures about these presuppositions; (c) finally, SUPP(C) must be replaced by f D (C), the set of C-worlds which are maximally close to D. As a result, we have: (URR) Given β's view of the common ground, represented by the context set D, and β's suppositions about α's view of the common ground, suppositions represented by the context set C, an utterance of the sentence S by α is accepted as true by β iff, for every w
In this version of the context shift, β has her own view of the common ground and her own view of what is presupposed by the speaker α, and, in order to grasp what α said (and to accept it as a true statement), she accommodates the presuppositions she attributes to him through a minimal revision of her own view of the common ground. In other terms, (URR) expresses two crucial steps in β's interaction with α: (i) revision of her own view of the common ground to make it consistent with the presuppositions that she attributes to α: the result is the new context f D (C), which includes these presuppositions ; (ii) update of this revised context by retaining only the worlds where S is true. Once again, this approach, based on a global context shift whose result is f D (C), can be adequate to account for some interesting characteristics of the communicative exchange: for example, to account for some phenomena of context revision, which allow an addressee β to modify her own view of the common ground in order to make room for α's presuppositions and to accept (or reject) the content he wants to communicate. So, we might call the process described in (URR) update through revision because α's presuppositions become an integral part of the revised context to which the content of the utterance must be added. As mirrored by the formalism used in (URR), the complexity of this revision process depends on the compatibility of these presuppositions with β's view of the common ground. For example, suppose that β is convinced that the man wearing a fez is not Leo but Tom. Once she has realized that α presupposes that the man with the fez is Leo, she may want to revise her own view of the common ground (provided that she thinks that α is a reliable source of information on this subject). In this case f D (C), which represents the result of such a revision, is not a subset of D, which represents β's original view of the common ground, because the proposition that the man wearing a fez is Leo is not compatible with D. As for accommodation proper, it instantiates a "smoother" type of context revision, because it is characterized by the fact that the proposition presupposed by α is consistent with β's view of the common ground, so that the revised context f D (C) is a subset of D. Since it is this revised context which is updated by adding the content of the utterance, I will speak, in such cases, of update trough accommodation. While appropriate to account for such processes of context revision, for the same reasons discussed in connection with (TRR), (URR) is no longer adequate when truth and reference must be kept separate: when, in particular, α's presuppositions, which are relevant to pick out the intended reference of the definite description, are not incorporated into β's view of the common ground as a stable acquisition. This is the case of a phenomenon which occurs rather frequently in such communicative exchanges and whose main features are, in a sense, symmetrical to the characteristics of accommodation.
Discommodation.
To make the relationship between presupposition and common ground more explicit, I will adopt, with some modifications, a definition given in Soames (1982) : (PP) By uttering a sentence S, a speaker α presupposes the proposition p if and only if one can reasonably infer that α accepts p and regards it as uncontroversial, either because: a. α thinks that it is already part of the common ground, or because b. α thinks that the addressee β is prepared to add it, without objection, to what β supposes to be the common ground.
Take now the following variant of case B:
Case C. Sentence (1) (i. e. 'The man wearing a fez is a poet') is uttered by α, who, like everybody at the party, is sure that Leo is the only person wearing a fez. Although this piece of information is accepted by the members of the community at issue, it turns out to be false (whilst it is true, as before, that Leo is a poet). β, who is provided with independent information, knows it. So this is a possible dialogue between α and β 15 :
(3) α: The man wearing a fez is a poet. β: Yes, he (Leo) is a poet. But his hat is not a fez.
What is peculiar to this situation is the fact that α and β have different views of the common ground, for what is presupposed by α is questioned by β. But this fact does not prevent β from referring to Leo in the first sentence of her answer, for the simple reason that β takes into account the (false) assumption that Leo is the man wearing the fez as a tool to pick out the intended reference of the definite description. Thus, under the assumption that α (in spite of his confusion about Leo's hat) is a reliable source of information about Leo's literary activity, β can update her own view of the common ground by adding the information that Leo is a poet, without sharing the false presupposition that his hat is a fez (witness the second sentence in her answer). For reasons that will be clear in a moment, I will call such a process update through discommodation. I have assumed, for simplicity, that, unlike α, β is provided with true information. But this is not crucial in such situations. We can even imagine a situation where α uses a definite description (e. g. 'The man wearing an elegant hat') with a vague predicate like 'elegant', with respect to which α and β adopt different standards. In these cases, it would be misleading to speak of "false" or "true" presuppositions, although a dialogue similar to (3) is still possible:
(4) α: The man wearing an elegant hat is a poet. β: Yes, he (Leo) is a poet. But his hat is not elegant.
In general, such situations are characterized by the presence of a disagreement between α and β, and, at the same time, by the willingness of β to suspend temporarily her own presuppositions in order to grasp what α wants to say. Thus, in dialogue (3), β is perfectly aware that the man wearing a fez is not Leo, but she adopts tentatively α's point of view to determine the proposition he intends to express and to update her own view of the common ground with this proposition (in case she judges α well informed about Leo's literary activity). As I have already suggested, this phenomenon is, in a sense, symmetrical with respect to accommodation. For this reason I will speak of discommodation:
ACCOMMODATION: permanent 16 expansion of what, according an agent β, should be part of the common ground, in order to determine the content of the utterance; this expansion is obtained by adding some new piece of information which β judges to be presupposed by the speaker α and which β is willing to take for granted without objection 17 . DISCOMMODATION: temporary suspension of what, according an agent β, should be part of the common ground, in order to determine the content of the utterance; this suspension is required to take into account some new piece of information which β judges to be presupposed by the speaker α and which β is not willing to take for granted.
In these intuitive definitions, what is crucial is not the common ground as such (i. e. as a set of shared beliefs or attitudes), but, on the one hand, the views of the common ground that different agents have, and, on the other hand, their willingness to modify, if necessary, these views in order to determine the content of the utterance. This can be done in two ways: by adding information (if not problematic), or by a temporary suspension of pre-existing information in order to make room for information which sounds problematic, but which is required to make the continuation of the exchange possible. The term 'temporary' is necessarily vague here, for the addressee may suspend her own view of the common ground just for an instant (as in the examples (3β) and (4β), where β adopts α's point of view only to grasp the proposition he wants to express: a point of view which is immediately questioned in the second sentence of the answer), or for a longer period. Imagine, for instance, that, in the situation described in case C, β is not concerned with the pedantries about Leo's hat and that, to be cooperative, she refrains from uttering the second sentence, that is the sentence which expresses her objection to the way α uses the definite description. In this case α's (false) assumption can remain in force until the end of the exchange. Needless to say, such a cooperative attitude is highly motivated in all those situations in which there is no way to decide which of the competing views is the correct one. To sum up, both cases (accommodation and discommodation) can be described in terms of a context shift which involves different views of the common ground. What changes is the nature of this operation, as we shall see in a moment.
Truth Vs reference.
In the present theoretical framework there is no problem in accounting for accommodation, which is a very simple illustration of the process of context revision defined in (URR). To see this, suppose that p is the proposition which β thinks to be presupposed by α and that D is β's view of the common ground in which p must be accommodated: the result of this process of revision is represented by the context f D (p). As required by the above characterization of accommodation, not only must p be consistent with D: it must also be easily accepted by β. Thus, the only difference with respect to examples where a more drastic context revision is required is that f D (p) is simply a subset 18 of D, because it coincides with the intersection of D itself with p. 16 At least in the context of the communicative exchange. 17 See Stalnaker's discussion of the example 'I can't come to the meeting. I have to pick up my sister at the airport' uttered in a context where the addressee does not know that the speaker has a sister. In Stalnaker's words: 'The phenomenon of accommodation, in general, is the process by which something becomes common ground in virtue of one party recognizing that the other takes it to be common ground.' (Stalnaker, 2002: 711 .) It should be noticed that what Stalnaker describes here is the effect on the real common ground of the parallel processes of revision (assuming that these processes are successful) which the different agents achieve with respect to their own views of the common ground. In the text I concentrate on these more basic processes. 18 This is so, in the case of accommodation, because p (i. e. α's presupposition) is consistent with D. But, as pointed out at the end of sect. 4, in general this is not true of the revised context mentioned in (URR): for example when β must revise her view of the common ground by adding the information that the P is x, while she was convinced that Discommodation is more intriguing, because in this case p, the proposition which β judges to be presupposed by α, must not be incorporated into the revised context. Unfortunately, such a requirement cannot be satisfied by (URR), which does not allow us to keep the worlds relevant for truth separate from the worlds relevant for reference. But such a distinction is exactly what is necessary to account for discommodation, because in this case p, the presupposition which determines the intended reference, is not compatible with β's view of the common ground, so that the worlds in which the content of α's utterance should be evaluated as true or false cannot be pworlds. This is a general problem that does not concern only the cases of misdescription, witness the Proustian example discussed in a previous section.
Case D.
Imagine that α and β are speaking of Proust's Recherche and that, to emphasize the fictional nature of this work, α utters sentence (2b), repeated here:
(2b) No famous novelist has ever expired while visiting an exhibition of Swann's favourite painter.
To apply (URR) to this case, let D be β's view of the common ground, whilst R is β's view of the Recherche: a work which α and β know very well and which represents the context α appeals to in order to determine the reference of the definite description 'Swann's favourite painter'. The problem is that all the worlds in F D (R) are R-worlds, so that (2b) turns out to be false in those worlds. Thus, according (URR) the content of α's utterance cannot be accepted as true by β: which is not intuitively correct. And since the same happens in situations like the one described in case C, we can conclude that (URR) is unfit to account for the process that I have called update through discommodation.
For the same reasons, the truth conditions defined in (TRR) cannot account for the fact that the content of α's utterance is intuitively true in case D. The problem, here, is that this content is factually true (because in the real world no famous novelist died while visiting an exhibition of Vermeer), and not true in the Recherche, even though the context which picks out the intended reference of the definite description 'Swann's favourite painter' is the Recherche. But such a discrimination between reference and truth is not possible according to (TRR): as before, all the worlds in SUPP(R) = f {@} (R) are R-worlds, and in these worlds there is a famous novelist who expires while visiting an exhibition of Vermeer, so that, contrary to our expectations, (2b) is evaluated as false. I have dwelled on (TRR) and (URR) because the main idea which inspires them is to keep truth and reference together, in the sense that the contexts that are relevant to evaluate the whole sentences are also relevant to determine the references of the definite descriptions they contain. But we have just seen that in situations like those instantiated by cases C or D this is not correct, for what we do, intuitively speaking, when we judge (3α) or (2b) to be true, is to resort to the "counterfactual" context of the speaker's presuppositions or to the "counterfactual" context of the Recherche in order to pick out the intended reference of the definite description, whilst we resort to the real world (or what we assume to be the real world) in order to evaluate the whole sentence. The fact that this double level of the process is not mirrored in (TRR) or (URR) makes the former inadequate to characterize the notion of truth and the latter inadequate to characterize the notion of update through discommodation 19 .
everybody believed that the P is y. Thus, in a sense, accommodation is the "smoothest" process of context revision required to determine the content of a given utterance. 19 As for (TRR), in particular, we have seen that it is at the same time too strong (because (2b) is not evaluated as true) and too weak (because even the false presuppositions are evaluated as true).
Presuppositional slots.
The problem is that (TRR) and (URR) rest on the idea of a global context shift, so that the worlds of the revised context are used to determine both the reference of the definite description and the truth-value of the sentence. But if one reflects on the cases of "misdescription" (in a broad sense, so as to include (2b), where the reference of the definite description is determined with respect to counterfactual worlds) it is easy to see that a more fine-grained analysis is required. Take for instance (2b). We have just remarked that, intuitively speaking, the worlds in the context which is relevant to pick out the intended reference of the definite description (Vermeer), that is the Recherche, do not coincide with the world(s) where we are willing to evaluate the statement that no famous novelist has ever expired while visiting an exhibition of Vermeer. Similarly, in the circumstances described above, when judging (3α) true β is perfectly aware of the fact that she and α have different opinions about the reference of the definite description 'the man wearing a fez' and, as a consequence, of the fact that they have different views of the common ground. Thus, on the one hand, she has no reason to give up her own suppositions about the person who satisfies the definite description. On the other hand, she takes into account α's beliefs on the matter in order to grasp the content of the utterance and to update her own view of the common ground with that content, for she thinks that α is a reliable source of information about Leo's literary activity. It is as if, in processing the utterance made by α, β should open a temporary slot within her own presuppositional apparatus in order to take into account α's presuppositions. This effect can be described as a local context shift, which involves only the definite description at issue (or, in general, the NP at issue), and a little complication of the translation schema proposed at the outset is sufficient to account for it. The idea is that what we need is not only a contextual variable associated with the whole sentence, but also a specific one, associated with the definite description. So, the new translation schema is something like:
where K is a variable which can be bound by the initial lambda (when K = C, and in this case we would have something equivalent to (TRANS 1 ), because the only context involved is C), or which can be free (when K ≠ C), so that its value must be contextually fixed. According to this analysis, the case of update through discommodation, illustrated by dialogue (3), corresponds to the second option: the value of the variable is contextually fixed, and coincides with the context set representing β's conjectures about α's view of the common ground. Intuitively speaking, the idea is that, as shown by this particular use of the pronoun 'he', β wants to update her own view of the common ground with the proposition that Leo (i. e. the reference of the definite description 'The man wearing a fez' according to the view of the common ground that β attributes to α) is a poet. So, if R stands for the body of information that β thinks should be part of the common ground and S for the view of the common ground she attributes to α, the proposition with which β wants to update R is given by:
(5) λCλw[C(w) ∧ Poet(w)(The man wearing a fez(S)(w))](R) = λw[R(w) ∧ Poet(w)(The man wearing a fez(S)(w))].
Here, the reference of the definite description is picked out with respect to S, not with respect to R. Thus, (5) gives us the proposition that β is willing to accept as true and which leads her to update her own view of the common ground with the information that Leo is a poet. This attitude is made explicit in (3β), where β expresses her willingness to accept that proposition, while questioning the way in which one of its constituents (i. e. Leo) is identified.
But consider this other dialogue between α and β 20 :
(6) α: The man wearing a fez is a poet β: No, he is not a poet. The man you are referring to does not wear a fez.
This time, witness the second sentence in (6β), β sticks to the body of information that she thinks should be part of the common ground, so that the individual she refers to by using the pronoun 'he' is not Leo, but Theo. In other words, the referent of the definite description is picked out with respect to R itself, not to S. To account for this situation we can resort to the first option made possible by (TRANS 2 ), to the effect that the variable in the presuppositional slot is bound by the lambda operator. What we obtain is the following proposition:
(7) λCλw[C(w) ∧ Poet(w)(The man wearing a fez(C)(w))](R) = λw[R(w) ∧ Poet(w)(The man wearing a fez(R)(w))].
As desired, this time the reference of the definite description is not Leo, because it is determined with respect to R (i. e. with respect to β's assumptions). And this is exactly the situation described by dialogue (6), where β is not willing to update her own view of the common ground with the proposition at issue, i. e. the proposition that Theo is a poet.
Truth in context.
We have just seen how the translation schema (TRANS 2 ) can help to account for the notion of update through discommodation. The same happens with the parallel notion of truth, that is the problem discussed at the outset. The distinction between considerations about truth and considerations about reference allows us to solve the problems raised by misdescriptions (in the broad sense of the term). In fact, we have observed that in such situations the approach based on a global context shift (illustrated by (TRR)) does not give us satisfying truth conditions. But, exactly as in the case of update through discommodation, thanks to the local context shift made possible by (TRANS 2 ) two different options are available in the case of truth. Consider again dialogue (6), where the first sentence in (6β) is about the semantic reference of the definite description occurring in (6α), that is about Theo. What makes (6α), i. e. 'The man wearing a fez is a poet', simply false is the fact that, on the basis of true information, the reference of the definite description is not Leo, but another person who is not a poet. For the same reasons, with respect to such assumptions, (6β) is simply true. Thus, if R is a context set representing a body of true information (that an agent, say β, thinks should be part of the common ground), an utterance of (6α) with respect to R is false because @ does not belong the following proposition:
This is exactly what we wanted in the case of the semantic reference. Thus, we are left with dialogue (3), which is about the speaker's reference. The idea is that the sentence 'The man wearing a fez is a poet', that is (3α), should be evaluated as true because the context S, representing the speaker's assumptions (or, more exactly, β's view of these assumptions), and distinct from R, is relevant to pick out the reference of the definite description (i. e. Leo). In the present theoretical framework this is accounted for by the fact that @ does belong to the following proposition:
(9) λw[R(w) ∧ Poet(w)(The man wearing a fez(S)(w))].
To sum up, the two options made available by (TRANS 2 ) correspond to two different ways of determining the reference of the definite description (whilst the "truthful" context R remains unchanged): when the context variable associated with the definite description is bound by the initial lambda, the context which is relevant to pick out the reference of the description is R itself, so that we get the interpretation based on the semantic reference; when that variable is free and its value can be fixed contextually by selecting the background of the speaker's presuppositions, we get the interpretation based on the speaker's reference. This approach can be generalized in the following way:
(TC) (i) Given a context X, represented by the context set C such that @ ∈ C, and given a presuppositional saturation π, an utterance of the sentence S in X is true with respect to
(ii) An utterance of the sentence S in X is true iff it is true with respect to every presuppositional saturation.
Here, π is an assignment of contexts to context variables. So, as usual, the interpretation of the sentence is relative to an assignment. Since only formulas without free variables are true (or false) independently of the given assignment and since the presence of a free variable corresponds to a possible local context shift, the idea is that, given a basic context C, in the interpretation based on the semantic reference no presuppositional slot is open (that is, no contextual variable is free), and C is relevant both for truth and reference. By contrast, the presence of a free contextual variable corresponds to the idea that a presuppositional slot is open, and this means that the reference of the description is fixed with respect a context which may be different from C. This time C is relevant for truth but not for reference. In other words, (TC) accounts for both a standard notion of truth, according to which reference, as truth, depends on the way things are, and a pragmatically oriented notion of truth, according to which reference may depend on the information possessed by an agent. One last remark. In (TC) it is explicitly assumed that the basic context C is a "true" context, i. e. @ ∈ C. This means that there are no false presuppositions. Such an assumption is partially justified by the fact that the cases of misdescription can now be treated by resorting to the distinction between the context which is relevant for truth and the context which is relevant for reference. Yet, we should not forget that, independently of the presence of misdescriptions, C might contain false, although irrelevant, assumptions of the type illustrated by case A. I have ignored this problem because misdecriptions are the main topic of the present paper, and (TC) seems to offer an adequate solution. In any case, as shown at the outset, the problem of "irrelevant" mistakes might be solved by adopting in (TC) a "harmless" context shift like the one in (TR). Accordingly, in the definition proposed in (TC) [[S] ] π should be applied not to C but to REV @ (C), as defined in connection with (TR). What we obtain is the following definition:
(TCR) (i) Given a context X, represented by the context set C, and given a presuppositional saturation π, an utterance of the sentence S in X is true with respect to π iff @ ∈ [[S]] π ( REV @ (C)).
Donnellan's dilemma.
In his 1966 paper, Donnellan distinguishes two uses of a definite description like 'the so-and-so'. In the attributive use, the speaker 'states something about whoever or whatever is the so-and-so', whilst in the referential use the speaker 'uses the description to enable his audience to pick out whom or what he is talking about and states something about that person or thing. In the first case, the definite description might be said to occur essentially […] ; but in the referential use the definite description is merely one tool […] for calling attention to a person or thing.' 21 This is why, in this second use, a speaker 'may say something true even though the description correctly applies to nothing' and our case B is a suitable illustration of this point. Some years later, Donnellan addresses a different, but related, problem. Consider, once again, case B, where α uses referentially the definite description 'the man wearing a fez' to denote Leo, whose hat is not a fez (even though everybody is convinced that it is). Actually the only person wearing a fez is Theo. Since, according to Donnellan, we are willing to admit that, by uttering sentence (1) (i. e. the sentence 'The man wearing the fez is a poet') α has said something true of Leo, he wonders whether this is just a pragmatic phenomenon or, on the contrary, the speaker's reference (Leo, in this case) has a semantic role to play. If it has such a role, what is relevant, for the truth conditions of (1), in these circumstances, is not Theo's properties, but Leo's properties (namely, the property of being a poet). If we adopt a Russellian characterization of propositions, this idea might be formulated by saying that Leo, the speaker's reference, is a constituent of the proposition expressed by (1) in the context at issue. It is in this sense that, according to Donnellan, the speaker's reference has a 'semantic significance' 22 , and that the truth-value is determined by the properties of the speaker's reference. To corroborate this hypothesis, he mentions some examples where, as in our dialogue (3), the reference of the anaphoric 23 pronoun 'he' is the speaker's reference, as we should expect, he thinks, if we assume that the speaker reference has a semantic relevance, that is a role to play in the truth conditions of the sentence. Let us sum up. On the one hand, there is the attributive/referential distinction, which many theorists are reluctant to treat as a semantic distinction (for they are reluctant to admit that the definite article is ambiguous). On the other hand, from Donnellan's point of view, the presence of the speaker's reference is what characterizes the referential use of a definite description, not its attributive use 24 . And since, according to him, the speaker's reference has a semantic role to play, as shown by its relevance for the truth conditions of the sentence in some cases of misdescription, this means that the truth conditions determined by the referential use are different from the truth conditions determined by the attributive use (where no speaker's reference is involved). But such a conclusion seems to entail a semantic characterization of the attributive/referential distinction, which is exactly what many theorists are reluctant to accept. Thus, we have to face the following dilemma: if the thesis of the semantic relevance of the speaker's reference were correct, 'it might be thought that […] an ambiguity in the definite article would at least be suggested and that it is intuitively very implausible to suppose such an ambiguity. So that, until the question of ambiguity is resolved, a real doubt remains about whether that position can be correct.' (Donnellan, 1978: 66.) 21 (Donnellan, 1966: 285.) 22 He says that in these cases 'the speaker's reference determines the semantic reference' or that 'the speaker reference appears necessary to provide semantic reference'. (Donnellan, 1978: 55, 62.) Notice that this use of the expression 'semantic reference' to speak of the relevance of the intended individual for the truth conditions of the sentence does not coincide with Kripke's use of the term 'semantic referent', which applies only to the thing, if any, that does satisfies the definite description. Kripke's "semantic reference" corresponds to Donnellan's "denotation" (of a definite description), even though there some fluctuation in the use of these terms in Donnellan's paper. 23 In Soames (1994) several arguments are presented to reject the idea that, in such cases, the pronoun 'he' is an anaphoric element. This issue deserves a separate discussion which cannot be developed here. 24 'Let us say that a definite description is uttered in a referential context when speaker reference exist relative to it … A definite description will be uttered in an attributive context when speaker reference relative to it is absent.' (Donnellan, 1978: 53.) 
Escaping the dilemma.
There is a fair amount of discussion in the literature concerning the semantic relevance of the speaker's reference and its relationship with the attributive/referential distinction. In particular, a number of authors have endorsed Donnellan's dilemma, by rejecting 25 the thesis of the semantic relevance as entailing the ambiguity of the definite article or, on the contrary, by accepting that thesis and the semantic ambiguity that it is supposed to entail. Much of the debate, of course, might depend on terminological issues. Yet, if by 'semantic ambiguity' one means that the semantics of the definite article should include two distinct rules of interpretation, then the theoretical framework adopted here suggests a possible way out from Donnellan's dilemma by allowing us to recognize the semantic relevance of the speaker's reference without assuming any ambiguity of the definite article, because definite descriptions are associated with a single rule of interpretation. So, what I would like to show, in this last section of the paper, is not that the ambiguity hypothesis is false (because such a discussion is beyond the purpose of the present paper, although I find unitary theories preferable), but only that it is possible to account for the semantic role of the speaker's reference and its relevance for the determination of the truth conditions without assuming the ambiguity of the definite descriptions. The idea is that, in case (i), the body of information associated with the relevant context C is strong enough to select an individual u as the only individual satisfying P in C, so that u is the intended referent of the description 'the P' with respect to any evaluation world w (even though u might not satisfy this description in w). On the contrary, in case (ii), as suggested by Donnellan's characterization of the attributive use (according to which the speaker 'states something about whoever or whatever is the so-and-so'), no particular individual is selected by C 27 , and the 25 As far as I can judge, this is officially Kripke's position. According to his analysis, there is no need to admit the semantic relevance of the speaker's reference, because the cases of misdescription like those illustrated by dialogue (3) can be accounted for by appealing to a pragmatic explanation based on Gricean rules. Yet, in some passages of his paper he expresses some doubts about the real nature of these phenomena: 'I myself feel that such a sentence [the sentence "Her husband is kind to her"] expresses a falsehood, even when "her husband" is used referentially to refer to a kind man; but the popularity of Donnellan's view has made me uncertain that this intuition should be pressed very far […] . In Naming and Necessity […] I suggested tentatively that Donnellan's remarks about reference have little to do with semantics or truth conditions. The point would be put more exactly if I had said that Donnellan's distinction is not itself a semantical one, though it is relevant to semantics through pronominalization.' (Kripke, 1977: 269, 275 .) As I have already pointed out, the idea that the notion of speaker's reference is strictly pragmatic and has no semantic significance is clearly stated in Soames (1994) , where Donnellan's remarks about pronominalization are discussed at length. 26 Adopting alternative treatments of definite descriptions, in particular a Russellian one, would not interfere with the remarks I am about to develop and would be equally appropriate. 27 In most circumstances this is so because the information available to the speaker α is not reach enough to select a particular individual as the reference of the of the description 'the P' (even though α presupposes that there is only one individual that satisfies the description). Yet, as suggested by Donnellan, there are situations in which the speaker is provided with the necessary information about the identity of the individual at issue, but she suspends it in order to state denotation of the description, with respect to any evaluation world w, depends on which individual, in w, satisfies the description. Take again sentence (1), which in the context of a dialogue such as (6) receives an interpretation based on the semantic reference of the definite description. (1) is evaluated as false in this case. (Do not forget that, in Kripke's sense, the semantic reference of a designator is given by the formula: meaning of the designator (as determined by linguistic conventions) + relevant facts). But we have also seen that, according to Donnellan, there is a sense in which, in the interpretation based on the speaker's reference, as in the case of dialogue (3), (1) is evaluated as true. These different results can be accounted for by the fact that the world @ belongs to the proposition (9), that is λw[R(w) ∧ Poet(w)(The man wearing a fez(S)(w))], but not to proposition (8), that is λw[R(w) ∧ Poet(w)(The man wearing a fez(R)(w))].
Notice that we get these results by applying rule (D) in both cases: what changes, when passing from (8) to (9) is only the role of the variable associated with the NP, which in (8), but not in (9), is bound by the lambda operator. Thus, in (8), the context to which the meaning of the description is applied (according to rule (D)) is R, that is the context of true assumptions where Theo (the semantic reference) is picked out as the relevant individual. But in (9) the meaning of the definite description applies to S, representing the speaker's view of the common ground, so that, this time, the relevant individual is Leo. Intuitively speaking, (9) corresponds to an interpretation in which a presuppositional slot is tentatively opened in order to take into account the speaker's assumptions with respect to a local constituent of the sentence (the definite description). But no slot is opened in (8), where the relevant assumptions are those represented by the basic context R. Given this kind of analysis, there is a further question to be addressed: for what reason the notion of truth based on the speaker's reference is often associated, from an intuitive point of view, with a feeling of uneasiness 28 which is absent from the notion of truth based on the semantic reference? A possible answer to this question is that when a speaker α uses a misdescription to identify a particular individual u and to state that u is Q, it is not correct, strictly speaking, to say that α stated something true, of u, for the simple fact that u is Q. It would be much more appropriate to say that, in this case, α stated something true, of u, with respect to the criteria of identification available to α. In this sense, the notion of truth based on the speaker's reference is covered by clause (i) in (TC) 29 , where truth is defined with respect to a presuppositional apparatus which may diverge from the the given context C. This is made possible, in a logical form such as (9), by the presence of a free contextual variable. On the contrary, the absence of free variables in (8) leads us to clause (ii), where truth is defined independently of idiosyncratic criteria of identification. Such an independence characterizes the notion of plain truth, that is the notion of truth based on semantic reference, but not the notion of truth based on the speaker's reference, and this difference can explain the feeling of uneasiness associated with the latter notion. Finally, it is noteworthy that, if such a reconstruction is correct, to fix the speaker's reference there is no need to appeal to "Gricean" pragmatic rules. The procedure is the same that is used to fix the semantic reference and established by the semantic rule (D): take the meaning of the definite description and apply it to a context (that is a set of worlds representing an information state). The difference is that, in the case of the semantic reference, this context is C (which, as specified by (TC), represents a body of true assumptions), whilst in the case of the speaker's reference it is the context that corresponds to the speaker's assumptions. No ambiguity of the definite description is presupposed here. In both cases the reference is given by the formula: meaning (determined by something, in general, about whoever or whatever is the P. In this case, the relevant context C, in definition (D), does not coincide with the full information available to α. 28 As remarked by Kripke (1977: 262) : 'It seems hard for us to say that when he [the speaker] uttered, "Her husband is kind to her", it expressed a truth, if we believe that her husband is unkind to her.' 29 Or, more exactly, in (TCR). But, to simplify the discussion, I will ignore the presence, in the context, of false assumptions which are not relevant to determine the reference of definite descriptions. linguistic conventions) + relevant facts. As expected, different representations of the facts may yield different results.
Conclusions and open problems.
I started out from the following problem: what happens when the body of information which is presumed to be common to the participants in a communicative exchange contains some false assumption? Or, more exactly: is it possible to state anything true against such a background? To answer this question I considered two types of "deviant" contexts. First of all I proposed a definition of truth conditions which allows us to deal with the presence, in the presumed common ground, of "harmless" mistakes, that is false assumptions which do not affect the referential apparatus presupposed by the speaker. In this case, as suggested by definition (TR), it is sufficient to replace the deviant context with a context where the false assumption has been removed. Formally speaking, such a move is guaranteed by a context shift which gives us a revised context if any false assumption is present, otherwise it gives us back the original context. Unfortunately, such a simple strategy is not possible when the false assumption concerns the identification of the individual the statement is about. Donnellan's cases of "misdescription" are the most typical examples of this kind of situation. This time the simple solution proposed in (TR) is not sufficient, because if the false assumption is simply removed, there is no way to pick out the intended reference of the definite description and, as a consequence, there is no way to determine the content that the speaker wants to communicate. To solve this problem I considered a more complex context shift, so as to get a revised context which incorporates the false assumption at issue. Yet, however "close" to what is supposed to be the real world, the worlds in this context are unfit, in many cases, to give us the intuitively correct evaluation of the sentences. This is proved by the inadequacy of (TRR) as a general definition of truth, even though the type of context shift on which it is based can help us to understand how different views of the common ground can interact in a communicative exchange. Such an interaction is mirrored in definition (URR): whilst structurally similar to (TRR), it resorts not to the notion of common ground as such, but to the conjectures that an agent makes about it and about the conjectures made by other agents, so as to account for the familiar phenomenon of accommodation. The problem, with these two last definitions, is that, because of the "global" context shift they appeal to, there is no way to discriminate between considerations about reference and considerations about truth. This strict interdependence of reference and truth is perfectly justified when the worlds, in a given context, that are relevant to evaluate the sentence as true or false coincide with the worlds that are relevant to fix the intended reference of a term, for example a definite description. But a more flexible strategy must be adopted to deal with the phenomena of discommodation, characterized by the presence, in the context presupposed by a speaker α, of an assumption p that an addressee β must take into account even though β cannot accept it because it is in contrast with the body of information that, according to her, should be part of the common ground. To account for the existence of such "presuppositional slots" that an agent can temporarily open when interacting with other agents, in the formalism sketched in the paper a definite description (or, in general, a Noun Phrase) is associated with a variable for contexts: when this variable is bound by the initial lambda we obtain something equivalent to the usual truth conditions (in the sense that what is relevant for truth is also relevant for reference), but when the variable is free, the context which can be fixed as its value represents an alternative source of information, with respect to the given context, in order to pick out the intended reference of the definite description. This local context shift, which concerns only the NP, characterizes the truth conditions proposed in definition (TC), which is used in the last section of the paper to explain why, in the cases of misdescription like those made popular by Donnellan, the speaker's reference can have a semantic relevance in determining the truth conditions of the utterance. Interestingly enough, without assuming any ambiguity of the definite article, the approach discussed in the paper, allows us to account for this role of the speaker's reference as a simple case of discommodation, where different views of the common ground are involved. From a formal point of view, the problem is that the nature and the exact position of the variable that has a crucial role in (TC) should be made more explicit. Several proposals 30 are available in the literature, but one of the major problems with them, as far as I can see, is to make them compatible with cases of discommodation like those discussed here (e. g. (2b): 'No famous novelist has ever expired while visiting an exhibition of Swann's favourite painter'), where the worlds that are relevant for reference are not relevant for truth. First of all one should specify exactly the domain of such variables. Treating them as variables for worlds may not be sufficient, as shown by the fact that a sentence such as:
(10) ?Leo is always an erudite person is hardly acceptable in normal circumstances, whilst the sentence:
(11) Faust is always a very erudite person is not problematic in the interpretation that can be paraphrased by the conjunction: In Marlowe's tragedy Faust is a very erudite person and in Goethe's tragedy Faust is a very erudite person and… To explain this fact, the most natural solution is to assume, as I have done in this paper, that in (11) the variable bound by the adverb of quantification 'always' is a variables not for worlds, but for contexts: that is, a variable for sets of worlds, under the hypothesis that contexts are represented by context sets. Thus, on the one hand there are situations, like those illustrated by (2b), where this variable should remain free, so that its value can be fixed by the context of the discourse (independently of the rest of the sentence). But, on the other hand, there are circumstances, such as the one illustrated by (11), where it can be bound by a quantifier. In fact, if C is the set of relevant contexts we are referring to (i. e. Marlowe's tragedy, Goethe's tragedy, etc.), a possible paraphrase of (11) is the following:
(11') For every context c such that c ∈ C, in c Faust is a very erudite person.
Yet, consider this other example:
(12) The number of nuclear weapons is always remarkably smaller than the number Rumsfeld has suggested to the press. This sentence is perfectly appropriate in a situation where a reporter, in order to prove that Rumsfeld is lying about Iraq's nuclear armament, utters it after consulting different sources of information (as, for example, the United Nations, the European Community, and so on). What he means is that, whenever we compare the figure provided by Rumsfeld with the figure provided by any of those sources, the former is much bigger than the latter. In this case, if C is the set of relevant contexts (i. e. the information available to the United Nations, the information available to the European Community, etc.) a possible paraphrase of (12) is something like: 30 To account for the role of context in the interpretation of the Definites, Chierchia (1995: 220-222 ) uses relational variables which represent the contextually supplied information. In Stanley and Szabó (2000: 251) the variables for the domain restriction are associated with the common noun occurring in quantified expressions. In Percus (2000: 194-195) definite descriptions contain a situation pronoun which is bound by a lambda operator. Finally, contextual variables stand for subsets of the domain in Westertåhl (1985) or for submodels, with respect to a given model, in Bonomi (1992 Bonomi ( , 1998 . In all these cases it is not immediate to see how the proposed analysis can be deal with examples like (2b).
(12') For every context c such that c ∈ C, the number of nuclear weapons available to Iraq according to c is smaller than the number of nuclear weapons Rumsfeld has attributed to Iraq.
As predicted by the kind of analysis developed in this paper, the quantificational structure obtained in the case of (12) is sensibly different from the one obtained in the case of (11), because the bound variable is associated with the whole sentence in (11) but only with the definite description in (12). Unfortunately, a systematic treatment of these binding phenomena is far beyond the tentative formalism suggested in the paper 31 . A last problem concerns the ontological commitments of the treatment sketched here for discommodation phenomena. As the reader remembers, this treatment is based on the idea that, in a sentence such as (2b), the reference of the definite description 'Swann's favourite painter' is fixed by the presence of a variable which is locally anchored to a "counterfactual" context such as the Recherche. It is this reference which is used to evaluate the sentence as "factually" true, that is true in the real world @, which does not belong to the "counterfactual" context set associated with the Recherche. No problem arises here, because the intended reference (Vermeer) exists not only in the Recherche but also in @. Yet, consider a sentence such as:
(13) Vinteuil, the talented composer that Swann likes best, is a very unpretentious man. Unfortunately, most of the so-called superstars that have signed a contract with La Scala this year are much more arrogant and fastidious than Swann's favourite musician.
Suppose that the second sentence, in (13), is factually true, exactly as (2b). In both cases the referent of the definite description is picked out with respect to the Recherche. The difference is that the referent of the definite description 'Swann's favourite musician', that is Vinteuil, is a person who exists in the Recherche but not in the real world. To be sure, the presence of the contextual variable, which selects the "local" context required by the definite description, allows us to account for the peculiarity of such a situation, where the factual truth of the sentence is based on a relation between real persons on the one hand and a fictional one on the other. Formally speaking, this means that in some cases the extension of a relational predicate in the real world @ might involve individuals that do not exist @ 32 . Thus, it is natural to wonder if such a requirement can be motivated by independent reasons. 31 One relevant question, in this case, is the following: where is this variable situated in the logical form of the NP? 32 It should be noticed that this is exactly what happens in the intensional semantics proposed in Kripke (1963) , where the extension of a predicate P, in a world w, may contain individuals which do not exist in w (whilst the interpretation of the quantifiers is restricted to the domain of w).
